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Whitepaper · Initiative 2 of 3 · Version 1.0 · 13 November 2026

An open audit-gap map for Ethereum

Which deployed code no public audit report covers, function by function, with a citation for every claim

FIG 2.0Audit-gap map

FIG 2.0 — Grant proposal to TheDAO Security Fund, ETHSecurity Initiatives Round 2. Initiative 2 of 3. Public data and tooling, not paid audits.

  • Recorded data
  • 656callable functions, 10 protocols
  • 584in a cited audit scope
  • 72no audit found
  • 20public audit reports, hashed and quoted

Abstract

Protocols, researchers, contest platforms and bug-bounty programmes all ask the same question before spending review money: which of the code that is live on mainnet today has no public audit behind it? Answering it by hand means resolving proxies and facets, listing every callable function, finding every report, and reading each report's scope pages. Few teams do it, and nobody publishes the result in a form others can reuse.

The audit-gap map does this for the ten largest DeFi and infrastructure protocols on Ethereum, pinned to block 26,392,435. Every one of 656 callable functions gets one of four statuses, and every "In audit scope" claim carries the page, the exact quote, the quote's hash and the SHA-256 of the report it came from. The method is deterministic; AI only proposes candidate citations, and a validator records eight gates for every claim and never upgrades a failed or blocked one to coverage.

Today every one of the 656 functions has an answer: 584 sit in a cited audit scope and 72 have no audit found, each with the list of reports we read. The largest gap is Pendle's RouterV4 (58 functions): none of the 23 audit PDFs in Pendle's repository names the router files. This grant funds the open dataset and generator, expansion to 25 protocols with a refresh on every upgrade, contest-ready scope sheets, and adoption by the platforms that decide what gets reviewed next. The audits themselves stay paid by protocols.

1. The problem

Audit coverage decays quietly. A protocol is audited at launch; then it adds an extension, a new facet, a periphery router, a library upgrade. Each change may be reviewed by a different firm with a different scope, or not at all. The protocol's audits page lists the reports, but does not say which of today's deployed functions none of them cover.

  • Contest and bounty platforms scope reviews from what the protocol tells them, not from a map of what is uncovered.
  • Researchers looking for high-value unreviewed code must rebuild the same analysis for every protocol.
  • Protocols often do not know their own gaps, especially in code inherited through libraries or added by facets.
  • Users and wallets see "audited by X" for a protocol as a whole, regardless of which function they call.

2. Four statuses, defined strictly

Status of one callable function
StatusRuleHow to read it
Byte-for-byte matchAn exact-build record exists for this address: the deployed runtime equals a rebuild of the commit a report names.The code is the reviewed code. Scope still needs human review.
In audit scopeA collected public report names this function's source file. The binding cites page, quote and hashes.A reviewer was asked to look at this file. The deployed code has not been compared with it.
No audit foundWe hold the protocol's reports with extracted file lists, and none names this file.A candidate gap. A report we have not collected may still cover it.
Not checkedThe source path is unknown, or the protocol has no extracted file list.No conclusion either way.

The rules are applied in that order by one function (functionEvidence in lib/site/evidence/callEvidence.ts), and the same function feeds the explorer, the demos and this paper. Bindings that come only from a finding in a change review (for example a "Files:" line in a Lido or EigenLayer upgrade review) are kept and labelled "File named in a finding of a change review", so a reader can discount them.

3. How the map is built

3.1 The pinned catalog

  1. Pin a block. All reads use block 26,392,435. Its full header (including hash) is stored in pinned-state.json, so any later reader can check they are looking at the same chain state.
  2. Resolve deployments. For each protocol, the entry contracts are listed and followed through proxies and facets to the implementation that runs (Pendle's RouterV4 resolves to seven facets; Aave's Pool to its implementation revision 12).
  3. List functions. Every external and public function of every resolved contract is recorded with its signature, selector, mutability and inputs.
  4. Locate source. Each function is mapped to its source file using the verified source of the exact deployed bytecode (source-registry snapshots and checksum-pinned compiler ASTs).
  5. Derive dependencies. Call dependencies between functions are taken from the compiler's output, so the explorer can show what a function reaches. This is static analysis, not a live trace.

Each protocol's catalog is one JSON file (public/evidence/catalog/<protocol>-<build>.json) with snapshotBlock, snapshotHash, contracts, functions, nodes, bindings and reports. A manifest lists every file with its hash.

3.2 Collecting reports

Reports are collected from public sources only: protocol audit folders on GitHub, firm publication pages and their feeds. Each document is downloaded over HTTPS, and its SHA-256 and origin are recorded. Gate G0 passes only when the origin publisher is proven; otherwise it stays blocked (section 4). 20 distinct reports are held today: 10 from the original catalog and 10 added on 13 November 2026 because they name files that the twelve recorded transactions actually executed. The 13 November pass produced 15 supplement entries; 5 of them re-read a report the catalog already held, to cite files its original extraction missed.

3.3 Binding a report to a file

A scope binding says: report R names source file F. It is stored with the evidence that lets anyone check it:

{
  "protocolId": "compound",
  "sourcePath": "contracts/Comet.sol",
  "file": "Comet.sol",
  "reportId": "<report id>",
  "citation": {
    "documentSha256": "<SHA-256 of the retrieved PDF>",
    "locator": "page:4;section:Scope",
    "page": 4,
    "quote": "<exact text from the report naming the file>",
    "quoteSha256": "<SHA-256 of the quote>"
  }
}

File paths are matched by suffix on a path-segment boundary and case-sensitively, so Comet.sol never matches CometExt.sol. A reviewed version that differs from the deployed version is kept visible rather than silently matched. The full set is published at https://proofofaudits.com/evidence/supplements/scope-bindings.v1.json.

4. Eight gates every claim must pass

Each collected report becomes an evidence candidate, including any citation proposed by AI, and a deterministic validator checks it against eight gates. Each gate ends as passed, failed, blocked or not applicable. Blocked means a known missing proof is recorded as a blocker: it is not a failure, and it is never upgraded to coverage. A passing run means the candidate is consistent and honest about its gaps; it does not by itself verify a build or a signature.

Validation gates of the evidence collector
GateChecksExample failure codes
G0 SourceThe document came from a safe HTTPS origin, its hash is real and matches, the publisher matches the firm.origin_url_unsafe, document_hash_mismatch, publisher_mismatch
G1 CitationEvery claim has a locator, page and exact quote, and the quote appears in the document text.quote_not_in_text, quote_hash_mismatch, page_mismatch
G2 CommitThe reviewed commit is a full immutable hash in a named repository, cited from the report, or marked unresolved with a reason.commit_not_immutable, commit_uncited
G3 BuildCompilation is deterministic with a pinned compiler and dependencies.compiler_not_pinned, build_without_source
G4 RuntimeBuild-to-runtime match verified independently; only documented metadata, link and immutable transforms allowed.match quality recorded
G5 ScopeInclusions, exclusions, method limits, findings and fix rechecks considered.scope recorded per claim
G6 AttestationA firm signer is authenticated before any firm-attested claim. Report attribution is not a signed attestation.no firm attestation without a signature
G7 ChangeA change or revocation supersedes derived coverage atomically, keeping the original evidence.supersession recorded
Validator result of the 15 supplement entries added on 13 November 2026
GateResult across the reports
G01 passed, 14 blocked
G115 passed
G25 passed, 10 blocked
G315 blocked
G415 blocked
G58 passed, 7 blocked
G615 blocked
G715 not applicable

Read this table as the honest state of the evidence. G1 passes for every report: every quote was found in the document and its hash matches, which is what an "In audit scope" claim rests on. G3, G4 and G6 are blocked for every report, because none of these candidates claims a byte-for-byte build or a firm signature, so none of them can produce a release on its own. The per-report matrix is public at https://proofofaudits.com/methodology#gates.

5. Results at block 26,392,435

Audit coverage of every callable function, ten protocols, Ethereum block 26,392,435
Protocol and contractsFunctionsIn audit scopeNo audit foundNot checkedReports
Aave V3 · Pool revision 127573206
Uniswap V4 · PoolManager3331202
Compound III · USDC Comet9292002
Morpho Blue · core2828001
Lido stETH core · revision 49393001
Safe Smart Account 1.4.13232002
Pendle V2 · RouterV4 + 7 facets5805801
Sky sUSDS · pinned implementation5151001
Euler V2 · EVC + EVault implementation141141002
EigenLayer 1.13.0 · StrategyManager53431002
All ten protocols65658472020

Each protocol can be opened in the explorer at https://proofofaudits.com/explorer/functions, where each function opens with its source file, the citation behind its status and its dependencies.

Largest remaining gap per protocol
ProtocolLargest file with no audit foundFunctions in that fileGap files in protocol
Pendlelib/pendle-core-v2/contracts/router/ActionMiscV3.sol209
EigenLayerlib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/proxy/transparent/TransparentUpgradeableProxy.sol53
Uniswaplib/v4-core/lib/solmate/src/auth/Owned.sol21
Aave@aave/core-v3/contracts/dependencies/openzeppelin/upgradeability/InitializableUpgradeabilityProxy.sol12

Two readings matter. First, most functions of the large protocols do sit in a cited scope, which is good news that nobody had measured. Second, the gaps cluster: Pendle's router facets hold 58 of the 72 functions with no audit found. That is exactly where a contest or a bounty should look first.

All 20 public audit reports used, with the SHA-256 of the retrieved document
ProtocolFirmReportDateSHA-256 (prefix)
AaveMixBytesAave V3.7 security audit30 March 2026 · report date1eabc75a22ae…
AaveABDK ConsultingAave v3.5 code audit18 July 2025 · report date5b10473c8619…
AaveBlackthornSecurity Review For Aave v3.427 May – 8 June 2025 · review periode3dd14a1d112…
AaveCertoraAave v3.3 formal verification and manual review24 October – 7 November 2024 · review periodfd4d5727584f…
AaveABDK ConsultingAave V3 smart contract audit26 January 2022 · report date39d229b72646…
AaveTrail of BitsAave V3 Security Assessment29 November 2021 · report date (fix log 21 January 2022)5e1e02bfa049…
UniswapOpenZeppelinUniswap V4 core audit17 July 2024 · report datea47a75608486…
UniswapOpenZeppelinUniswap V4 Periphery and Universal Router Audit5 September 2024 · report dateee86897a2163…
CompoundOpenZeppelinCompound III audit14 June 2022 · delivered; published 20 July 2022e88e025aa58a…
CompoundOpenZeppelinComet Asset Extension Audit16 January 2025 · report date84bb30834633…
MorphoOpenZeppelinMorpho Blue audit13 October 2023 · report datea47b50009f40…
LidoCertoraLido V3 auditJanuary 2026 · report month only; draft9ca94dbf2936…
SafeAckee BlockchainSafe smart account 1.4.0 audit28 March 2023 · report date (Safe 1.4.0)bd64303f4ae9…
SafeCertoraSafe Smart Account v1.3.0 security review20–29 July 2026 · review period9b3bd212e97d…
PendleChainSecurityPendle V2 code assessment15 August 2024 · report date (V2 core scope)63e08e69377b…
SkyChainSecuritySavings USDS code assessment30 September 2024 · report date5a3903cb7bbb…
EulerChainSecurityEthereum Vault Connector code assessment6 May 2024 · report date (EVC scope)3e8239617f97…
EulerChainSecurityCode Assessment of the Euler Vault Kit Smart Contracts18 June 2024 · report datec90719f0efb4…
EigenLayerCertoraEigenLayer redistribution slash delay v1.13.011–12 May 2026 · review period; draft2793a930a796…
EigenLayerCertoraEigenLayer Slashing (V1.0.0) formal verification%20-%20Certora%20-%20Feb%202025.pdf)10 January – 11 February 2025 · review period430ef6ccc1bd…

6. Who uses it and how

Uses of the map
UserUseWhat they get
Contest and bounty platformsScope the next reviewA list of deployed functions with no public audit, grouped by file, with the source location and dependencies.
ProtocolsPlan audits after upgradesTheir own gap list, refreshed when an implementation changes.
Security researchersFind unreviewed high-value codeRanked gaps across protocols, without redoing the analysis.
Wallets and explorersShow per-function coverageThe same statuses Proof Before Sign shows at signing time (Initiative 1).
AuditorsProve their scopeA public, cited record of which deployed functions their reports cover.

7. Known limits

  • Scope evidence is file-level. A report naming a file does not prove every function in it was reviewed.
  • "No audit found" depends on the reports collected. A missing private or unpublished report produces a false gap; the map says "no audit found", not "unaudited".
  • Code outside the ten protocols is answered contract by contract from its own public reports (for example ChainSecurity for Permit2). USDC has no public report: Circle says Halborn audited v2.2, but the report is not published, so it shows "No audit found".
  • The dependency view is static and pinned to one block.
  • Contests are not listed publicly on the site yet.

8. What the grant funds

A public, continuously updated gap map: which deployed code sits outside every public report's scope, re-checked when contracts upgrade. Proposed ask: $60,000 over 9 months, of which $20,000 (one third) is adoption.

Milestones (proposed)
#MilestoneBudgetPass condition for the independent reviewer
1Open dataset and generator for the ten protocols, with the method documented. Code under Apache-2.0, data under CC BY 4.0.$15,000A third party regenerates the map from the published scripts and gets the same statuses.
2Expand to 25 protocols ranked by value held on Ethereum; refresh automatically when an implementation changes.$15,000Coverage list and upgrade refreshes visible publicly with dates.
3Per-gap scope sheets a contest or bounty can use directly (files, functions, dependencies, cited reports).$10,000Sheets published for every protocol.
4Adoption: at least 2 contest platforms, bounty programmes or protocols use the map to scope a review.$20,000Public reference from each adopter.

Outreach targets (none committed yet): Code4rena, Sherlock, Cantina and Immunefi among platforms; Compound and Pendle first among protocols, since they hold the largest gaps.

9. Check it yourself

  1. Download the bindings: scope-bindings.v1.json.
  2. Pick any binding, download the report from its URL, and check sha256sum equals documentSha256.
  3. Open the cited page and confirm the quote is there; hash the quote and compare with quoteSha256.
  4. Open the function in the explorer and confirm the source path matches the verified source of the deployed contract.

10. Team, reviewer and co-funding

  • Team. Proof of Audits, led by its founder, Veer (veer@proofofaudits.com). The map, the explorer and the 20-report evidence set described here are live and checkable.
  • Independent technical reviewer. To be agreed with TheDAO Security Fund before milestone 1 starts, with no ties to Proof of Audits, the ten protocols or the cited firms.
  • Co-funding. None committed as of 13 November 2026. We will ask the protocols with the largest gaps and the contest platforms that would use the map to pledge about 15%.

References

  1. Sourcify: verified source for deployed bytecodehttps://sourcify.dev/
  2. Scope bindings (raw data)https://proofofaudits.com/evidence/supplements/scope-bindings.v1.json
  3. Explorer dataset manifesthttps://proofofaudits.com/evidence/catalog/manifest.json
  4. Methodology and gate resultshttps://proofofaudits.com/methodology
  5. TheDAO Security Fundhttps://thedao.fund/