Scenario 1 · All checks passed
Covered exploit
A real local exploit of the fictional DemoVault flashLoan bug; the claim on the flashLoan leaf is approved and paid from the auditors who signed unit U1.
- transactions
- 30 transactions
- time steps
- 7 time steps
- checks passed
- 28 of 28 checks passed
- Evidence file
- scenarios/s1-covered-exploit.json sha256 82ff0efe0293…
Balances at the start and end
| Account | Before the first transaction | After the last transaction | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| BondEscrow | 0 | 24,000 | +24,000 |
| ClaimRegistry | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| RewardsVault | 0 | 9,000 | +9,000 |
| Protocol | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Claimant/beneficiary | 0 | 11,100 | +11,100 |
| Auditor A | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Auditor B | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Auditor C | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DemoVault | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Attacker | 0 | 12,000 | +12,000 |
Every step (37)
| # | Step | Call | Transaction hash | Block | Balance before → after |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Protocol creates the campaign (terms hash computed off-chain) | createCampaignProtocol → CampaignFactory | 0xa03cc801…9c3a20 | 15 | No token balance changed |
| 2 | Protocol mints valueless DemoToken for the reward, disclosure and adjudication budgets | mintProtocol → DemoToken | 0x0bf704bf…602508 | 16 |
|
| 3 | approve 9,000 to 0xaa1b…DA10 | approveProtocol → DemoToken | 0xb75ad83e…f09bd7 | 17 | No token balance changed |
| 4 | Protocol prefunds the RewardsVault | fundProtocol → RewardsVault | 0x48e7e50a…89ece6 | 18 |
|
| 5 | Time stepEnrolment opens | 19 | |||
| 6 | Auditor A mints a valueless bond | mintAuditor A → DemoToken | 0x5f466b09…ec4411 | 20 |
|
| 7 | approve 5,000 to 0x3F37…28B4 | approveAuditor A → DemoToken | 0x68b3d04a…bbe3d7 | 21 | No token balance changed |
| 8 | Auditor A enrols 5,000 on units {U0} with shared liability | enrolAuditor A → BondEscrow | 0x0bff76e2…39e580 | 22 |
|
| 9 | Auditor B mints a valueless bond | mintAuditor B → DemoToken | 0xd8df70b1…1fa41c | 23 |
|
| 10 | approve 10,000 to 0x3F37…28B4 | approveAuditor B → DemoToken | 0xdddcad81…96c5a1 | 24 | No token balance changed |
| 11 | Auditor B enrols 10,000 on units {U0, U1} | enrolAuditor B → BondEscrow | 0xef5ed41e…dc0b4a | 25 |
|
| 12 | Auditor C mints a valueless bond | mintAuditor C → DemoToken | 0x4089ad2d…9aa872 | 26 |
|
| 13 | approve 20,000 to 0x3F37…28B4 | approveAuditor C → DemoToken | 0xf61b9834…efc992 | 27 | No token balance changed |
| 14 | Auditor C enrols 20,000 on units {U1, U2} | enrolAuditor C → BondEscrow | 0x8f11e9b0…ae5092 | 28 |
|
| 15 | Time stepEnrolment ends; coverage starts | 29 | |||
| 16 | Anyone activates the campaign (identity re-checked) | activateProtocol → AuditCommitmentRegistry | 0xa1ff751b…a0fa6b | 30 | No token balance changed |
| 17 | Depositor mints valueless DemoToken | mint0x09DB…d55f → DemoToken | 0x1b7a9edc…81a337 | 31 | No token balance changed |
| 18 | approve 12,000 to 0x1309…cBBb | approve0x09DB…d55f → DemoToken | 0xc7366084…a11791 | 32 | No token balance changed |
| 19 | Depositor deposits 12,000 into the fictional DemoVault | deposit0x09DB…d55f → DemoVault | 0x8ed48391…dc77f8 | 33 |
|
| 20 | Time stepOne day of normal operation | 34 | |||
| 21 | Attacker deploys DemoExploit (flash-loan repayment bug) | constructorAttacker → | 0x7e74c3fb…902997 | 35 | No token balance changed |
| 22 | Attacker runs DemoExploit.run(): flash loan "repaid" with a deposit (flash-loan repayment bug) | runAttacker → 0x538d…e241 | 0x131ec290…c22933 | 36 |
|
| 23 | Time stepOne hour later the claimant files | 37 | |||
| 24 | Claimant mints the claim deposit | mintClaimant/beneficiary → DemoToken | 0x519b94c1…bae019 | 38 |
|
| 25 | approve 100 to 0x7B06…F8Ea | approveClaimant/beneficiary → DemoToken | 0x218c9a61…d67349 | 39 | No token balance changed |
| 26 | Claimant files a claim on the flashLoan leaf (unit U1) for 12,000 | fileClaimant/beneficiary → ClaimRegistry | 0x61a2e4be…f45873 | 40 |
|
| 27 | Time stepClaim 1: response window ends, voting opens | 41 | |||
| 28 | Claim 1 panel: seat 1 votes Approve 12,000 | castVote0x9965…A4dc → ArbitrationPanel | 0xf73ba8fb…83ba47 | 42 | No token balance changed |
| 29 | Claim 1 panel: seat 2 votes Approve 12,000 | castVote0x976E…0aa9 → ArbitrationPanel | 0x549ab56e…cd6339 | 43 | No token balance changed |
| 30 | Claim 1 panel: seat 3 votes Approve 11,000 | castVote0x14dC…9955 → ArbitrationPanel | 0x72f06111…23177f | 44 | No token balance changed |
| 31 | Time stepClaim 1 panel: vote deadline | 45 | |||
| 32 | Claim 1 panel: anyone closes voting | closeVotingProtocol → ArbitrationPanel | 0x37fb447b…b73148 | 46 | No token balance changed |
| 33 | Time stepClaim 1: appeal window ends | 47 | |||
| 34 | Claim 1: anyone finalises the ruling | finalizeProtocol → ClaimRegistry | 0x00981421…d66942 | 48 | No token balance changed |
| 35 | Claim 1: anyone settles (pays 11,000) | settleProtocol → ClaimRegistry | 0x84720e55…313632 | 49 | No token balance changed |
| 36 | Beneficiary withdraws the payout credit | withdrawCreditClaimant/beneficiary → BondEscrow | 0x27764e22…4ff33a | 50 |
|
| 37 | Claimant withdraws the refunded claim deposit | withdrawCreditClaimant/beneficiary → ClaimRegistry | 0xd2772c3e…8bc89a | 51 |
|
Checks the run asserted (28 of 28)
- passterms hash (TypeScript port) equals registry.termsHash()
- passEIP-712 enrolment digest for A matches escrow.enrolmentDigest
- passEIP-712 enrolment digest for B matches escrow.enrolmentDigest
- passEIP-712 enrolment digest for C matches escrow.enrolmentDigest
- passphase is Active
- passexploit flash-loan repayment bug: attacker gained the vault balance
- passexploit flash-loan repayment bug: DemoVault drained
- passclaim 1: reservation of A recomputed from headroom (F-21, F-22)
- passclaim 1: reservation of B recomputed from headroom (F-21, F-22)
- passclaim 1: reservation of C recomputed from headroom (F-21, F-22)
- passruling amount is the third-largest approval (C-28)
- passoutcome Approved
- passclaim 1: status Settled
- passclaim 1: paidAmount equals min of all bounds (F-26)
- passclaim 1: A paid recomputed by waterfall (F-27)
- passclaim 1: A reservation released
- passA ledger reconciles (available + reserved + paid + withdrawn = deposited)
- passclaim 1: B paid recomputed by waterfall (F-27)
- passclaim 1: B reservation released
- passB ledger reconciles (available + reserved + paid + withdrawn = deposited)
- passclaim 1: C paid recomputed by waterfall (F-27)
- passclaim 1: C reservation released
- passC ledger reconciles (available + reserved + paid + withdrawn = deposited)
- passclaim 1: beneficiary credit increase
- passclaim 1: claim deposit refunded to claimant (CA §8)
- passBeneficiary withdraws the payout credit: token balance increased by the credit
- passClaimant withdraws the refunded claim deposit: token balance increased by the credit
- passescrow holds the remaining principal